This paper investigates the macroeconomic and welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration on the native born within a dynamic general equilibrium framework with labor market frictions. A key feature of the model is that job competition is allowed for between domestic workers and illegal immigrants. We calibrate the model to match some key statistics of the postwar U.S. economy. The model predicts that in the long run illegal immigration is a boon, but the employment opportunities of domestic workers are strongly negatively a¤ected. The model also predicts that the level of domestic consumption has a U-shaped relationship with the share of illegal immigrants.
Introduction
Illegal immigration is a contentious issue facing most developed economies. In the United States, for instance, scholars have heatedly debated the pros and cons of illegal immigration for years. The main economic argument in support of immigration is that it helps increase the supply of labor, reduces the cost of production and hence is good for the economy. Primary opposing arguments include supposed high rates of use of welfare programs, immigrant poverty and job competition.
Much of the discussion is motivated by concerns for the welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration on the native born. However, most research applying partial-equilibrium analysis has only addressed slices of this problem through analyzing the e¤ects of immigration on labor-market outcomes. There is only a small set of theoretical studies that address this issue of illegal immigration in a general equilibrium context. These studies have noticeable limitations. Among them, Ethier (1986) and Bond and Chen (1987) are carried out within a static context and they pay particular attention to problems and prescriptions for border control. Following the Ramsey tradition, subsequent research supplements the literature by investigating this issue within a one-sector dynamic general equilibrium framework. These studies include Hazari and Sgro (2003) , Moy and Yip (2006) , and
Palivos (2009).
One common limitation among all existing studies is that they assume full employment in domestic labor market. These models thus ignore the e¤ect of illegal immigration on the employment opportunities of domestic workers. In fact, one common argument in general against immigration is that immigrants harm the employment opportunities of native workers. Studies failing to address this issue cannot capture the whole picture of the e¤ects of illegal immigration. The primary objective of this paper is to develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that can be used to evaluate the displacement e¤ects of illegal immigration on native workers. To the best of our knowledge, so far no such theoretical model has been developed. To achieve this objective, this study builds upon the contributions of Shi and Wen (1997) and models illegal immigration in a standard dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market frictions. One key feature of our model that di¤erentiates it from the previous literature is that we allow both domestic workers and illegal immigrants to search for jobs at the same time, which in turn leads to job competition between them and consequently increases the unemployment rate of native workers.
In the model economy, each individual has three alternative, mutually exclusive uses of one indivisible unit of time: searching for a job, working for a …rm, or enjoying leisure. Firms hire both domestic and illegal immigrant workers. The labor market is subject to search-matching frictions.
Once unemployed domestic workers and job vacancies are matched, the terms of employment contracts are determined through bilateral bargaining. We assume that …rms are able to distinguish illegal immigrants from domestic workers and face a punishment for hiring the former if being caught. The wage rate for illegal immigrants is thus equated to the wage rate of domestic workers minus the expected value of the punishment. We characterize the search equilibrium and prove the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium.
The model generates important theoretical predictions due to the incorporation of illegal immigrants. Within this dynamic general equilibrium framework, we are able to show analytically that the long-run level of the unemployment rate for domestic citizens is increasing in the share of illegal immigrants in the total population for the case in which natives and illegal immigrant workers are perfect substitutes in the production process. We also uncover that the entry of illegal immigrants makes domestic workers face tighter labor markets in the long run.
To develop the quantitative implications of our model, we numerically solve and calibrate the model to match some key statistics of the postwar U.S. economy. Palivos (2009) …nds that illegal immigration necessarily lowers the long-run level of per capita consumption and welfare of domestic citizens. In sharp contrast, the quantitative predictions of this study indicate that the long-run level of consumption of domestic citizens has a U-shaped relationship with the share of illegal immigrants. In other words, an increase in the number of illegal immigrants …rst reduces and then raises the long-run level of per capita domestic consumption. This …nding is due to the presence of four e¤ects at work. (1) A positive exploitation e¤ect. When there is an increase in the number of illegal immigrants, a greater number of unemployed illegal immigrants are searching for jobs.
In contrast, the change in the number of domestic workers searching for jobs is small. This leads to a tighter labor market which in turn leads to more …erce competition for jobs. To successfully secure a job, both domestic and foreign labor would have to lower their wages. This raises the …rm's pro…ts which are then distributed to domestic households as dividends. This e¤ect adds to domestic consumption. (2) A negative capital-using-up e¤ect. This is due to the fact that in the domestic economy some capital has to be used to produce output for the consumption of illegal migrants. This e¤ect reduces current output which could have been used for domestic consumption and investment. (3) A negative wage depressing e¤ect. As mentioned above, when more illegal immigrants enter into the economy, the competition for jobs becomes more severe. Thus, the wages for domestic labor are pushed down. (4) A negative displacement e¤ect. As unemployed domestic labor and migrants compete for jobs, the chance for unemployed domestic workers to …nd a job is reduced. This e¤ect reduces domestic consumption. Empirical studies on this topic often focus on (3) and (4) (for instance, see Hotchkiss and Myriam 2008) . These four e¤ects work together to determine the relationship between the long-run level of consumption of domestic citizens and the share of illegal immigrants. Under the baseline parameterization, the negative e¤ects dominate when the population fraction of illegal immigrants is small. Thus, an increase in illegal immigration would lead to a drop in consumption. However, as the share of illegal immigrants continues to increase, the long-run level of domestic consumption would rise as the positive e¤ect eventually dominates. This gives rise to the U-shaped relationship between the long-run level of consumption of domestic citizens and the share of illegal immigrants.
In order to shed some light on the welfare e¤ects of illegal immigration, we compute the consumption-equivalent level of utility of domestic households and …nd that illegal immigration has a positive welfare e¤ect. In particular, we compare two scenarios: (1) the economy stays at the steady state with no illegal immigrants forever; and (2) at t = 0, the host country admits a certain fraction of illegal immigrants and the economy gradually converges to the new steady state.
The welfare measure of illegal immigration is calculated for a wide variety of combinations of labor supply elasticity and population share of illegal immigrants. For instance, we …nd that the domestic households would require a :746-percent increase in their consumption under scenario (1) in every period when the labor supply elasticity is 0:4 and when there is an increase in the population share of illegal immigrants from zero to 5 percent. The model also generates a prediction on employment opportunities of domestic workers. It predicts that employment opportunities of domestic workers are strongly negatively a¤ected in the long run. Speci…cally, a greater number of domestic workers will leave the labor force when there is an increase in illegal immigration. In contrast, the labor force participation rate for illegal immigrants experiences a slight decrease. This result turns out to be qualitatively supported by the existing empirical evidence (for instance, see Borjas et al., 2007) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the search-theoretic model of unemployment and analyzes the search equilibrium. Section 3 studies the welfare e¤ect of illegal immigration on domestic citizens and discusses the quantitative implications of the model. Finally, Section 4 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
The Model
Consider an economy that is inhabited by two types of households, i.e., domestic (D) and illegal immigrant (M ) households. 1 The number of each type of households is normalized to one. Each household consists of many in…nitely lived agents. We use L(t) and M (t) to denote the size of each domestic and immigrant household at any time t 0, respectively. We call N (t) = L(t) + M (t) the total population. Both L(t) and M (t) are assumed to be growing at the same constant rate g > 0. 2 The share of illegal immigrants in the total population is constant over time m = M (t) N (t) . Each household member at each point in time is endowed with one indivisible unit of time that has three alternative, mutually exclusive uses: searching for a job, working for a …rm, or enjoying leisure.
Throughout we use a superscript i 2 fD; M g to indicate these two types of households. The variable s i 1 (t) is the fraction of the household's time in work, and s i 2 (t) is the fraction of the household's time in search. The variable s i 1 (t) is also referred to as the search e¤ort. Accordingly, at the aggregate level, a representative domestic household spends L 1 (t) = s D 1 (t)L(t) of its total amount of time in search, and 
; respectively.
Aggregate output Y (t) is produced according to the Cobb-Douglas production technology that takes as inputs aggregate capital K(t) and aggregate labor L 2 (t) + M 2 (t),
1 Although both legal and illegal immigrants act as a factor substitute for native labor of similar skill, in this model, we only consider illegal immigrants because they work as a cheaper production substitute for domestic workers of the same level of labor productivity. 2 Imposing this assumption is to ensure balanced growth properties of the model.
where is the capital share of national income. Domestic labor L 2 (t) and illegal migrants M 2 (t) are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production. 3 
Domestic Household's Utility Maximization Problem
In each period, each household member derives utility from consumption and disutility from working and searching for jobs. The momentary utility function of a typical agent is given by
; > 0; and > 0;
where denotes the inverse of labor supply elasticity, and is a preference parameter.
The household's total discounted utility is described by
The variables C(t) and c(t) = C(t)=L(t) are aggregate and individual consumption of the domestic household, respectively. 4 The parameter > 0 is the discount rate, and g the e¤ective discount rate, which is assumed to be greater than zero.
A worker receives a wage rate w(t) when he enters an employment relationship. Let r(t) denote the rate of return to capital net of depreciation at time t; and (t) be the amount of dividends that a household receives by owning the …rm. Thus, the momentary budget constraint faced by a representative domestic household is
Dividing it by the size of population N (t) gives the budget constraint in per capita terms as
where _ %(t)
dt is the time derivative of the variable %(t), = L(t)=N (t) is the ratio of domestic to total population, (t) = (t)=N (t) is dividend per capita and k(t) = K(t)=N (t) is capital per capita. 5 The number of employed domestic workers evolves according to
where (t) is the rate at which unemployed workers …nd jobs and > 0 is the job destruction rate. In equilibrium, (t) is determined by the aggregate numbers of job vacancies and unemployed workers. In the utility maximization problem, however, (t) is taken as given by a representative household. Upon dividing by N (t), an individual's employment evolves according to the law of motion:
The representative domestic household's optimization problem is to choose a set of time paths
t) so as to maximize (2) subject to (3), (5) and two initial conditions: 
Equation (7) states the rule for the household to decide how much e¤ort it should put into search.
It requires the marginal cost of search to be equal to the marginal bene…t of search. 5 As de…ned earlier, m =
: Thus, m = 1 holds true for each time period.
Given the separable utility function form in (1), combining (6) and (9) and rearranging terms yield a simple expression for the Euler equation:
where the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption is 1. This condition describes the evolution of individual's consumption. In other words, it states that if r exceeds ; then individual consumption will expand over time. By using (6), (7), and (8), we obtain
An important implication of (13) is that in order to compensate for the search cost the wage rate has to be set above the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. 6 
Immigrant Household's Utility Maximization Problem
Similar to the domestic households, in each period each immigrant household member derives utility from consumption and disutility from working and searching for jobs. The momentary utility function of a typical immigrant agent is given by
; > 0; and > 0:
The migrant household's total discounted utility is characterized by
The variables C M (t) and c M (t) = C M (t)=M (t) are aggregate and individual consumption of immigrant household, respectively. Under the conventional assumptions in the literature, illegal migrants are paid at the wage rate w M (t) which is distinct from that paid to domestic labor, w(t). 7 This is due to the fact that in most developed countries, …rms have to pay a …ne once they are caught 6 It can be shown that if
as in a typical neoclassical model; the shadow price of employment (t) can grow without bound. 7 See also Hazari and Sgro (2003) hiring illegal migrants. In a competitive market, the wage rate w M (t) is equated to the marginal product of the illegal immigrants minus the expected value of the punishment. In this study, as described later, the wage rate for domestic workers is endogenously determined through a Nash bargaining process. Given the assumption that …rms are able to distinguish illegal immigrants from domestic workers, the wage rate for illegal immigrants is therefore equated to the wage rate of domestic workers minus the expected value of the punishment. Moreover, it's assumed that illegal migrants do not accumulate capital in the host country. This can be justi…ed by the fact that in most developed countries illegal immigrants …nd no way to legally establish credit and own assets. 8 The budget constraint that a representative migrant household faces is therefore
Dividing it by N (t) gives the budget constraint in per capita terms as
Analogous to (4), the number of employed illegal immigrants evolves according to
Upon dividing by N (t), an individual's employment evolves as follows:
Let~ (t) be the costate variable of illegal immigrant household's employment. The maximization conditions for the representative immigrant household with respect to s M 1 (t), s M 2 (t) and the associated TVC are
In particular, (20) governs illegal immigrant household's optimal decision on the search e¤ort.
Production
In this economy, there are a large number of identical …rms. Firms hire both domestic and foreign labor from the labor market to produce output. In order to hire labor, the …rm has to post job vacancies V (t). Each vacancy costs d > 0 units of output. The probability that a …rm …nds an unemployed worker is (t): Similar to (t), (t) is determined by the aggregate numbers of job vacancies and unemployed workers in equilibrium. However, in the pro…t maximization problem, (t) is taken as given by a representative …rm. The law of motion of a …rm's employment is given by:
Taking the factor prices as given, a representative …rm chooses a set of time paths fK(t), L 2 (t), M 2 (t), V (t)g so as to maximize its present value of the future pro…t streams. Formally, this is given by
subject to (23) , and
The parameter is the rate of capital depreciation, and p 2 (0; 1) the probability that a …rm which employs illegal migrants gets detected. 9 The …ne for employing illegal migrants is normalized to one per illegal immigrant worker. Let (t) and (t) be the costate variables of …rm's employment of domestic and foreign labor, respectively. Interior solutions of the above maximization problem are characterized by the …rst-order conditions
Equation (25) is the usual condition which states that the rental rate on capital is equated to the marginal product of capital. Equation (26) governs the …rm's optimal vacancy decisions. The marginal cost of vacancy d equals the marginal bene…t of vacancy (t) (t). Equation (28) demonstrates that if there is no vacancy maintaining cost for the …rm i.e., d = 0, we would obtain the standard neoclassical productivity condition for labor w(t) = F L 2 (t). In that case, …rms would post an in…nite number of vacancies and there will not any search frictions in the labor market. With positive d; however, the wage rate for domestic workers w(t) is less than the marginal product of labor F L 2 (t) in this model.
The relationship between the wage rates paid to domestic worker w(t) and illegal immigrant
The wage rate w(t) for domestic workers is determined through a Nash bargaining process which will become clear later on. As p is positive, it follows that wage rate w M (t) paid to illegal migrants is strictly lower than that paid to domestic labor. Notice that the above condition also indicates that the punishment of hiring illegal immigrants is completely borne by the illegal immigrants themselves. Firms therefore do not su¤er directly from employing illegal immigrant workers.
Matching and Wage Determination
The labor market is subject to search-matching frictions. Vacant jobs and unemployed workers are brought together in a pair-wise fashion by a stochastic search-matching process. The search part follows from the fact that both domestic workers and immigrants invest some time and e¤ort in searching for jobs. Meanwhile, …rms seek workers to …ll vacant job positions. The matching part of the process is derived from a matching function which pairs the unemployed workers with vacancies. For analytical convenience, we employ a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns-to-scale. 10 The number of successful job matches is determined by the following matching function:
where V (t) is the number of vacancies, L 1 (t)+M 1 (t) is the number of unemployed workers searching for jobs, is the elasticity of vacancy in job matches, and 0 > 0 is assumed to be constant over time.
Given the Cobb-Douglas matching function, the vacancy-matching rate (t) and the job-…nding rate (t) are obtained as follows:
where the ratio between the vacancies and the unemployed workers,
; is conventionally labeled as the tightness of the labor market. Intuitively, it captures the pressure that unemployed workers and …rms face in the labor market. Speci…cally, workers and employers face a tighter labor market when x(t) is smaller. The above expressions make clear the dependence of the rates (t) and (t) on the tightness of the labor market x(t): In particular, (t) falls with x(t) and (t) rises with x(t):
With the use of this matching function, the equilibrium outcomes are not Pareto optimal. This is due to the presence of search externalities inherent in the model. The intuition is as follows. On the one hand, with more unemployed workers participating in search, …rms will be bene…cial since vacancies are more likely to be …lled. However, unemployed workers will su¤er as their chance to match themselves with a job is reduced. On the other hand, with more open vacancies, unemployed workers win while …rms searching for workers lose. Thus, the decentralized outcome is not e¢cient because workers and …rms do not take into consideration the costs that they impose on others. The activities that generate a negative externality are carried out to a greater extent than are socially desirable.
Unemployed domestic workers and vacant jobs meet in pairs. A successful job match generates a surplus for both unemployed domestic workers and employers. How is this surplus shared between them? It is a matter of bargaining. The standard search and matching model assumes that by choosing a proper wage rate this surplus is maximized according to the Nash solution to a bargaining problem. In particular, if a …rm hires a domestic worker, then the surplus to the …rm from employing him is f 
The solution of this is given by
The optimal wage is a weighted average of the worker's marginal product of labor and reservation wage, which is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. If domestic workers have relative stronger bargaining strength, i.e., is closer to one, then the optimal wage is closer to the marginal product of labor. In this model, illegal immigrants have no bargaining 1 1 As denoted above, k(t) = K(t)=N (t); the Cobb-Douglas production function in per capita terms can be written
The derivative of u with respect to s
] represents the domestic workers' endogenized reservation wage.
power, i.e., they are not allowed to bargain over the wage with the …rms. Rather, as mentioned above, their wage rate w M (t) is determined by (30).
Market Equilibrium
In this subsection, we provide all the necessary ingredients of this model as follows:
De…nition A search equilibrium consists of a set of time paths
; prices fr(t); w(t); w M (t) j t 0g; pro…t f (t) j t 0g; and matching rates f (t); (t) j t 0g such that
3. Given fr(t); w(t); w M (t); (t) j t 0g, fk(t); v(t); s D 2 (t); s M 2 (t) j t 0g solves the …rm's problem.
4.
The wage rate w(t) is determined by (33).
5.
The matching rates are given by (31) and (32):
6. All markets clear.
(a) The goods market clears at every t 0, i.e.,
(b) In the labor market, in equilibrium, the ‡ows of workers into employment must equal the ‡ows of vacancies matched with unemployed agents, i.e., (t)[L 1 (t) + M 1 (t)] = (t)V (t):
(4), (18) , and (23) indicate that the total supply for labor equals the demand for labor at every t 0.
Characterization of Equilibrium
After simple manipulations and substitutions, the equilibrium de…ned above is summarized by the following seven di¤erential equations which together determine the dynamic properties of
The three initial conditions of this system are k(0); s D 2 (0); and s M 2 (0): 13
Proposition 1: A unique steady state exists.
All proofs can be found in the Appendix. Notice that this unique steady state is in per capita terms. All aggregate variables, such as K(t); C(t); are still growing at rate g > 0:
3 Quantitative Analysis 
Parameterization
This subsection presents the procedure used to parameterize the model. The speci…c numerical values to the parameters of the model are assigned so that the model can match as closely as possible some key statistics for the U.S. economy for the postwar period. In particular, the model aims to match U.S. facts on the labor participation rate, the unemployment rate, the average capital-output ratio, and the real interest rate.
There are eleven parameters which need to be assigned in this model: the preference parameters , , and ; the production parameters and ; the search-matching parameters 0 ; ; , the rate of population growth g; the bargaining power of domestic labor and the unit cost of vacancy d:
As a time period is normalized to be one quarter, each parameter is interpreted quarterly.
The preference parameter is set equal to 3:7939 to match the steady-state labor force participation rate of 0:68. This is consistent with the U.S. labor force participation rate for the population aged 16 years old and over in the postwar period. 14 We choose the depreciation rate on capital = 0:0108 so that the quarterly capital-output ratio in the steady state is equal to 12; which roughly matches the average capital-output ratio in postwar U.S. data (Cooley et al., 1995) . The unit cost of vacancy d is set at 2:064 to achieve the steady-state unemployment rate of 0:06, which matches the U.S. quarterly average unemployment rate in the postwar period. 15 We use the discount rate = 0:01 so that the steady-state annual interest rate is roughly 4% (Siegel 2002). 16 The value of the capital's share of national income is set to 0:25, which falls in the range in Gollin (2002) . 17 We set the value of = 2:5 to obtain a labor supply elasticity of { = 0:4 (Killingsworth 1983). We also allow { to take di¤erent values 0:2, 0:7 and 1. The parameter 0 is commonly normalized to one. As indicated in Blanchard and Diamond (1989), the parameter for the elasticity of vacancy in job matches is 0:6, hence = 0:6: We use the exogenous job destruction rate = 0:05; which resembles the quarterly employment-unemployment transition probability (Shi and Wen 1999). The value of bargaining power of labor is set to 0:5, a value commonly used in the literature. We use the rate of population growth g = 0:0027 as the annual population growth rate in the postwar US is roughly 1%: The baseline parameterization is summarized in Table 1 . 
Local Dynamics
We next examine local dynamics by linearizing the system of di¤erential equations in the neighborhood of the steady state. As stated in Proposition 1, the nonlinear dynamic system has a unique steady state at (c ; k ; x ; s D 1 ; s D 2 ; s M 1 ; s M 2 ) T . Let J be the 7 7 Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state .
The dynamic properties of the linearized system is determined by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J: The predetermined variables are k(t); s D 2 (t); and s M 2 (t): Saddle-path stability requires that the number of stable eigenvalues be exactly the same as the number of predetermined variables.
Therefore, the matrix J needs to have three stable eigenvalues and four unstable eigenvalues in order to ensure the existence of a unique transition path.
In the quantitative exercise, we allow the population share of illegal immigrants m to vary between 0 and 0:5. 18 In all of these experiments we obtain three stable eigenvalues and four unstable eigenvalues. By allowing { to take values in f0:2; 0:4; 0:7; 1g, we …nd that the above result is robust with respect to changes in the labor supply elasticity. The values of the stable eigenvalues are reported in Table 2 . Thus, the unique steady state is saddle-path stable under the baseline parameterization.
Macroeconomic E¤ects
In this subsection, we develop the quantitative implications of the model. In particular, we focus on the steady-state e¤ects of illegal immigration. In order to demonstrate the economic impact of illegal immigration on domestic residents, we now perform some comparative static experiments.
In the …rst comparative static experiment we are concerned with the e¤ects on the long-run level of domestic consumption when there is an increase in the share of illegal immigrants in the population.
Speci…cally, by allowing the fraction of immigration m to take values from 0 through 0:5; we compute a series of steady states to capture the response of domestic consumption to an in ‡ux of illegal immigrants.
The quantitative prediction of the present model is that the long-run level of consumption of domestic citizens has a U-shaped relationship with the share of illegal immigrants (see Figure 2) .
In other words, an increase in the number of illegal immigrants …rst reduces and then raises the long-run consumption of the domestic citizens. 19 The intuitions of these results are as follows. The presence of illegal migration has four e¤ects.
The …rst one is the exploitation e¤ect. As shown in Figure 2 , when there is an increase in the number of illegal immigrants, a greater number of unemployed illegal immigrants are searching for jobs. In contrast, the change in the number of domestic workers searching for jobs is small. This leads to a tighter labor market which in turn leads to more …erce competition for jobs. To successfully secure a job, both domestic and foreign labor would have to lower their wages. The …rms therefore make more pro…ts. In turn, domestic citizens receive more dividends which can be used for consumption and investment. This e¤ect adds to domestic consumption. Second, the capital-using-up e¤ect. This is due to the fact that the illegal immigrants do not save in the domestic economy. Some capital has to be used to produce output for the consumption of illegal migrants. This e¤ect reduces current output which could have been used for domestic consumption and investment. Third, the displacement e¤ect. As unemployed domestic labor and migrants compete for jobs, the chance for unemployed domestic workers to …nd a job is reduced. This e¤ect lowers their consumption. Fourth, the wage depressing e¤ect of illegal immigrants. 20 As more illegal immigrants enter into the economy, the competition for jobs becomes more severe. Thus, the wages of domestic labor are pushed down. The net impact of illegal immigration on domestic consumption hinges upon the magnitude of these four e¤ects. If the exploitation e¤ect dominates, domestic consumption will rise. Otherwise, it will fall.
More precisely, the steady-state equilibrium value of the domestic consumption c is determined
To understand the intuition of this comparative static …nding, we di¤erentiate (41) with respect to and obtain
the wage depressing e¤ect
the capital-using-up e¤ect (42) Equation (42) implies that there are three results generated by an increase in the population share of illegal immigrants (a decrease in ) in the U.S. The …rst result is that domestic labor income falls. This is due to the displacement and negative wage depressing e¤ects, which are captured by the two terms in the …rst square bracket of (42), respectively. The second square bracket re ‡ects the positive exploitation e¤ect. The reason is that as more illegal migrants are in the U.S., domestic households receive more dividends which can be used for consumption and investment. The last square bracket shows how the domestic capital income is a¤ected by the in ‡ows of illegal migrants.
When the share of illegal immigrants goes up, the capital per worker k declines while the capital per domestic citizen k rises, which generates additional income for domestic households. 21 Figure 2 summarizes the responses of the key variables in this model (c ; x ; k ; w ; s
) to a gradual increase in illegal immigration. 22 When it goes up, the model predicts that workers and employers face a tighter labor market, i.e., x goes down, 2 1 In the steady state, r = : Therefore, the capital income is solely determined by the quantity of capital. Notice that comparing with domestic residents, we observe that there is only a small reduction in the labor force participation rate for illegal immigrants
The reason for this is that with more illegal immigrants in search, domestic workers …nd the opportunity cost of searching for jobs becomes higher so that it's optimal to withdraw from supplying labor and to enjoy leisure instead. 23 This result turns out to be consistent with the existing empirical evidence. 
Welfare E¤ects
In order to answer the question of how illegal immigration a¤ects domestic welfare, we compute and compare, using a consumption-equivalent measure as in Lucas (1987), the level of utility of domestic households under two scenarios.
Let c(t; m); s D 1 (t; m); s D 2 (t; m) denote the equilibrium time paths when the population share of illegal immigrants is m: The lifetime utility of the representative domestic household is given by
The consumption-equivalent measure (m) is de…ned by
If (m) > 0; then U (0) < U (m) which means that the domestic households are better o¤ in the presence of illegal immigrants. In particular, the domestic households would require a (m)-percent increase in c 0 (t; 0) in every period so as to make themselves indi¤erent between m = 0 and m > 0:
Hence, illegal immigrants create a welfare gain to the host country's economy. On the contrary, if
The domestic household are now willing to surrender (m)-percent of c 0 (t; 0) in every period so as to expel the illegal immigrants. This means that illegal immigrants lead to a welfare loss to the host country.
Suppose the economy starts at the steady state with m = 0: The two scenarios that we consider are as follows:
1. The economy stays at the steady state with m = 0 forever.
2. At t = 0, the host country admits m > 0 fraction of illegal immigrants and the economy gradually converges to the new steady state. Hence, U (m) is computed based upon the transition path. To account for the transition path, the procedure described in Cooley and Ohanian (1997) is carried out.
Given a speci…c numerical value of m, we can simply calculate the corresponding (m): 24 Table   3 shows the welfare measure of illegal immigration. Three results can be drawn from Table 3 :
First, it is instructive to note that illegal immigration induces important net gains among domestic citizens for any values of (m; {). For instance, when { = 0:4 and when there is an increase in m from zero to 5 percent in the US, the domestic households would require a :746-percent increase in c 0 (t; 0) in every period. Second, these gains increase in the share of illegal immigrants in the population for each …xed { that we consider. Third, (m) clearly depends upon the magnitude of the labor supply elasticity. In particular, for each …xed m > 0, (m) decreases with the labor supply elasticity {: Table 1 .
In order to shed some light on the above computational results, we di¤erentiate the domestic household's utility with respect to m and obtain the following expression (43). As we require the economy to move from zero to an arbitrary amount of illegal immigration, we evaluate (43) at m = 0. Equation (43) reveals that the e¤ect of illegal immigration on domestic welfare depends on two factors: (1) the change in the level of per capita consumption of domestic citizens, and (2) the change in the domestic labor participation rate.
These two factors jointly determine the welfare e¤ect of illegal immigration. In general, it's not possible to obtain de…nite results analytically. We thus resort to numerical exercises. We focus on one particular example and examine the transition paths of consumption and leisure. The example that we consider here is when { = 0:4 and when there is an increase in m from zero to 5 percent. Under the baseline parameterization, illegal immigration lowers domestic consumption level throughout the entire transition. It …rst reduces and then raises the labor force participation rate during the transition (see Figure 5) . By (43), we know that the overall welfare e¤ect is ambiguous as these two changes tend to move domestic welfare in opposite directions. Nevertheless, according to our simulation, the positive welfare e¤ect dominates. Thus, illegal immigration induces a welfare gain to the host country's economy. This welfare gain comes from an increase in leisure.
Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the existing literature on welfare e¤ect of illegal immigration on domestic workers by introducing illegal immigration into a standard dynamic general equilibrium framework with labor market frictions. We therefore construct and calibrate a search-theoretic model. In the model economy, illegal immigrants enter domestic production as perfect substitutes for domestic workers. They are allowed to spend their one indivisible unit of time in searching for a job, working for a …rm, or enjoying leisure in each period. Firms hire both domestic and illegal immigrant workers. Once unemployed domestic workers and vacant jobs are paired with each other, they jointly determine the wage rate through bilateral Nash bargaining. As we assume that …rms are able to distinguish illegal immigrants from domestic workers and face a punishment for hiring the former if being caught. The wage rate for illegal immigrants is thus equated to the wage rate of domestic workers minus the expected value of the punishment.
We characterize the search equilibrium and prove the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium. In contrast to the previous studies, our analysis reveals three striking results. First, although illegal immigration is indeed a boon to the United States, it signi…cantly harms the employment opportunities of domestic workers. Namely, it increases the unemployment rate for domestic workers. Furthermore, it forces them to face a tighter labor market and even to leave the labor force. Second, we quantitatively prove that the long-run level of consumption of domestic citizens has a U-shaped relationship with the share of illegal immigrants. Third, illegal immigration's negative impact on native wages has been found in this framework. This result turns out to be qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence.
To close the paper, we like to point out one line of future research. In this study, we assume that domestic workers and illegal immigrants are perfect substitutes. However, empirical evidence documents that even with the same level of education, they are not perfect substitutes. 25 Therefore, the analysis will become more interesting if illegal immigrants can be modeled as a separate factor 2 5 For a related dicussion, see, among others, Borjas (2003) and Card and Lemieux (2001) .
of production. Moreover, in real life, the debate over illegal immigration has also concerned with its distributional e¤ects. Assuming that domestic and foreign labor di¤er in terms of their production skills, the distributional impact of illegal immigration on domestic workers can be analyzed in a search-theoretic framework. Nevertheless, this extension would not be trivial. We have to consider a two-sector version of the search model. This could signi…cantly increase the dimension of the dynamic system.
Proof of Proposition 1.
In a steady-state equilibrium, consumption, c ; capital, k ; market tightness, x ; fraction of domestic worker in search, s D 1 ; fraction of domestic workers in work, s D 2 ; fraction of illegal immigrants in search, s M 1 ; and fraction of illegal immigrant in work, s M 2 , are constant over time.
Given the functional forms on utility and production functions, the steady state
can be described by the following seven equations with seven unknowns:
(1 ) c (s
Determination of a unique steady state
The equations (44)- (50) together determine a unique steady state with the following steps.
Step 1, First …nd the expression for the marginal rate of substitution (
) by using (46).
Substituting it into (47), we can solve for a unique x :
Step 2, Combining (49) together with (50) pins down a unique s M 1 :
Step 3, s M 2 is obtained by substituting s M 1 into (50).
Step 4, Substituting (44), (48), and the expression for marginal rate of substitution ( Step 5, The solution for s D 1 can be attained by substituting s D 2 into (47).
Step 6, k is obtained by substituting s D 2 and s M 2 into (44).
Step 7, Finally, substituting s D 1 ; s D 2 and x into the expression for the marginal rate of sub-
Finding a unique solution for x _ x = 0 implies
Equation (51) can reexpressed as
Substituting (52) into (53) yields The curve for g(x ) is strictly increasing, but the curve for h(x ) is strictly decreasing with respect to x . In addition, h(0) > g(0): If a solution to (54) exists then it is unique. In the above graph, it's easy to observe that there exists a unique intersection point between the above two curves. Thus, (54) yields a unique solution for x .
In order to establish the e¤ect of an increase in illegal immigration on the labor market tightness, @x @ ; one can di¤erentiate (54) with respect of .
From (55), we show that there is a positive relationship between x and : Therefore, more illegal immigrants induce a tighter labor market.
Finding the domestic unemployment rate
The unemployment rate for domestic labor is de…ned by
With the aid of (x )s D 1 = s D 2 + gs D 2 ; the domestic unemployment rate can be reexpressed as
Di¤erentiating (56) with respect to gives
It shows that the long-run level of the unemployment rate for domestic citizens rises with more illegal immigrants entering into the economy.
Finding a unique solution for
The curve for h(s M 1 ) is strictly increasing, but the curve for g(s ; we can …nd a unique s M 2 :
Finding the e¤ect of an increase in illegal immigration on the fraction of migrants in search Di¤erentiating (58) with respect of yields
From (59), we observe a negative relationship between and s M 1 : Thus, when free entry is allowed, more illegal immigrants search for jobs in the long run.
Finding the e¤ect of an increase in illegal immigration on the fraction of migrants in work
Di¤erentiating (50) with respect to gives
The adverse consequence of the entry of illegal immigrants is that the fraction of illegal immigrants in work becomes lower. 
given by (52), we have
Therefore,
) A > 0: as 0 < < 1 and 0 < < 1:
Let LHS and RHS of (60) be h(s D 2 ) and g(s D 2 ), respectively.
There is a unique intersection point between the curves for h(s D 2 ) and g(s D 2 ), which leads to a unique solution for s D 2 .
Finally, the unique s D 2 implies the unique s D 1 ; k ; and c as s
The above procedures demonstrate that a steady state of this dynamic system can be uniquely determined. domestic labor force participation rate 
